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REGULATION SECTION 1.355 UNDER FIRE
JOSEPH D. HOLMES, JR.*
Some of the most interesting and complicated corporate tax problems
which a practitioner encounters involve the "spin off," "split off" and "split
up" provisions of section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section
355 deals with the tax free division of a single corporation into two or
more separately functioning corporations. While neither the Code nor the
Regulations mention "spin off," "split off" or "split up," these terms are
part of the common parlance of taxation and are useful to bear in mind.
A spin off occurs where a part of the assets of a corporation are transferred
to a new corporation in exchange for a controlling interest in its stock
which is distributed to the stockholders of the transferor corporation without
the surrender of any of that corporation's stock. In a split off the transferor
corporation transfers part of its assets to the other corporation in exchange
for its stock which the transferor exchanges with its stockholders for part
of their stock in the transferor corporation. In a split up the transferor
corporation exchanges the stock of the transferee corporation with some of
its stockholders for all of their stock in the transferor corporation.'
The actual division into two or more corporations can be accomplished
without much difficulty. The difficult tax problems arise from the subsequent
distribution of the stock of the new corporation or corporations to the shareholders of the original corporation. The distribution to shareholders must
usually be accomplished strictly within the framework of section 355.2 Simi_
lar problems are encountered when a parent corporation attempts to distribute the stock of a controlled subsidiary corporation to its existing
shareholders.
The Regulations under section 355 were proposed on December 11,
1954 and promptly adopted on December 2, 1955. Since their adoption, these
Regulations have been the object of a substantial amount of litigation and
it is probable that there is more to come. This Article deals with three of
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1.

3

MERTENS,

LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 20.100 (1957).

The three

types of divisive situations are discussed and differentiated in Chester E. Spangler, 18
T.C. 976 (1952). See generally Mintz, "Divisive Corporate Reorganizations: Split-ups
and Split-offs," 6 TAX-L. REV. 365 (1951).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 354 authorizes the tax free distribution of stock or
securities if the stock or securities in a corporation party to a reorganization are exchanged solely for the stock or securities in the same or another corporation which is
a party to the reorganization.
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the major problems the Commissioner has experienced in the courts with
the attempted enforcement of Regulation section 1.355: (1) the two active
businesses concept; (2) the business purpose doctrine; and (3) so called
"stock swaps."
SECTION

355

Section 355(a) provides that if (1) a corporation distributes to its
shareholders with respect to their stock, solely stock of the corporation
which it controlled immediately before the distribution; (2) the transfer was
not used principally as a device for distributing earnings and profits in either
corporation; (3) the requirements of subsection (b) with reference to active
conduct of businesses are satisfied; and (4) all of the stock of the controlled
corporation held by the distributing corporation, or a controlling interest
therein is distributed, and tax avoidance is not a principal purpose thereof,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to the shareholders on receipt of
the stock.
Section 355(b) makes subsection (a) applicable only if either (1) the
distributing corporation and the controlled corporation or corporations are
engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade
or business, or (2) immediately before the distribution, the distributing corporation had no assets other than stock in the controlled corporations and each
of the controlled corporations is engaged immediately after the distribution in
the active conduct of a trade or business. For purposes of section 355(b) a
corporation is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business if and only if
(1) it is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business, or substantially
all of its assets consist of stock of the corporation controlled by it which is so
engaged; (2) such trade or business has been actively conducted throughout
the five year period ending on the date of the distribution; (3) such trade or
business was not acquired within the five year period in a transaction in which
gain or loss was recognized in whole or part; and (4) control of a corporation which was conducting such trade or business was not acquired directly
by another corporation within the five year period, or if it was so acquired
it was acquired in a tax free transaction.
DIviSION OF

A SINGLE BUSINESS

One of the first and most substantial challenges to the Regulations
occurred in Edmond P. Coady v. Commissioner.3 In that case, the petitioner
and one Christopher each owned 50% of the stock of the Christopher Company which was engaged in the construction business. Differences arose
between the petitioner and Christopher and it was decided to separate the
3. 33 T.C. 771 (1960).
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business into two unrelated enterprises. Christopher Company then organized
E. P. Coady and Co., and transferred approximately one-half of its construction contracts, equipment, cash and other assets to the new company
in exchange for all of the new company's stock. Immediately thereafter, the
Christopher Company distributed all of the stock in E. P. Coady and Co.
to the petitioner in exchange for all of his stock in the Christopher Company.
After the distribution both the Christopher Company and E. P. Coady and
Co. were actively engaged in the construction business. When Coady reported
the transaction as a tax free split up under section 355 he was challenged
by the Commissioner on the basis of Regulation section 1.355(1) (a).
Regulation section 1.355(1) (a) provides "for the separation, without
recognition of gain or loss to the shareholders and security holders, of two
or more existing businesses formerly operated, directly or indirectly, by a
single corporation .
single business .

. .

. . ."

. Section 355 does not apply to the division of a
In an opinion in which five judges dissented the

Tax Court held invalid that portion of the Regulations which denies application of section 355 to the division of a single business. The court said
that it could find no language in either the Code section or the report of
the Senate Committee on Finance 4 which required that the distributing corporation be engaged in more than one business before the distribution. 5 The
decision of the Tax Court was affirmed in a per curiam opinion by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 6 Subsequently, on October 3, 1961,
the Internal Revenue Service, announced that while there was no basis for
a request of certiorari to the Supreme Court, it would not follow the Coady
decision in disposing of similar cases. 7 However, since the announcement,
the Coady doctrine has been followed by the Tax Court in H. Grady Lester,
Jr.,8 and by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
4. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
5. 33 T.C. at 775. Five judges dissented on the ground that the interpretation of
section 355 adopted in the regulations is not unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with
the statute, and that according to Supreme Court holdings Treasury Department Regulations may not be invalidated unless they are unreasonable or inconsistent with the
revenue laws. In a separate dissent Judge Harron did not wish to narrow the issue
solely to the question of whether section 355 applies to the division of a single business.
He felt the consideration of whether the petitioner realized taxable gain should be
determined by an investigation of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.
6. 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961), aff'd mem., 33 T.C. 771 (1960).
7. Technical Information Release No. 339. This release was the basis for Rev. Rul.
61-198, 1961 CuM. BULL. 45 which pointed out that the decision in Coady was one of the
first impression and that the IRS would maintain its position pending further judicial test
of the Treasury Department Regulations.
8. 40 T.C. 947 (1963) (dictum). Under the facts the court found that there were
two separate businesses being conducted for at least five years prior to the distribution,
but noted that even had there been only a single integrated business their decision would
have been governed by the majority opinion in the Coady case.
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Georgia and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in W. W. Marett
et al. v. United States.'
In view of the strong position taken by the Internal Revenue Service
in the October 3, 1961 information release, it appeared that the service
would continue to resist the Coady doctrine in anticipation that sooner or
later one of the courts of appeal would sustain the Regulations and provide
a basis for seeking a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. However, on
April 3, 1964, the Service announced that it had changed its position and
would follow the Coady and Marett decisions. 10 It is anticipated that the
Regulations will be amended in the near future to reflect this change.
BUSINESS

PURPOSE

A second area which appears destined to produce litigation and continued disagreement between the courts and the Commissioner is the business
purpose requirement of every reorganization, including a divisive transaction
under section 355. The business purpose requirement is not specifically
stated in the language of the Code but has been one of the requirements of
a tax free reorganization ever since the doctrine was first enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering.11 In a nutshell, the business
purpose rule requires that there be a valid business reason other than tax
considerations before recognition of the gain realized in a reorganization
transaction will be deferred. An area of controversy has arisen as to whether
the only business purposes which will satisfy the requirement are corporate
business purposes or whether the scope of the inquiry should be broadened to
encompass the business purposes of the stockholders as well.
For many years the courts unanimously held that the business purpose
had to be one that serves the interests of one of the corporations which is
a party to the reorganization. 12 These decisions were consistent with the
language of the Regulations under the 1939 code.' 3 However, in Survaunt v.
Commissioner14 decided in 1947, and Estate of John B. Lewis v. Commissioner15 decided in 1949, the corporate business purpose was temporarily
9. CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) f 9567 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
10.

Technical Information Release No. 564, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP.

6515.
11. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See Palace Theatre v. United States, 148 F.2d 30 (7th
Cir. 1945) ; Kochin v. United States, 187 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
12. See generally, Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Free Reorganization,
61 YALE L.J. 14, 31-33 (1952); Spear, Corporate Business Purpose in Reorganization,
3 TAx L. REv. 225 (1947).
13. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112(g)-i, 2 (1939), as amended, T.D. 5402, 1944 Cum.
BULL. 233.

14. 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), affirming, 5 T.C. 665 (1945).
15. 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), affirming, 10 T.C. 1080 (1948).
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abandoned by the Internal Revenue Service and rejected as the only business
purpose which will qualify a reorganization as tax free. In both these cases
the taxpayers were arguing against a determination that there had been
a tax free reorganization, the purpose in Survaunt being to effect an increase
in basis and in Lewis to avoid the effect of the receipt of boot which may
be taxed as ordinary income. The taxpayers in both of these cases argued
that the corporate affairs had been reorganized solely for the personal purposes of the shareholders and consequently the transactions did not qualify
as tax free reorganizations. This argument was rejected in both cases and
the courts concluded that the correct approach is to disregard examination
of corporate business purposes and shareholders business purposes and to
determine instead "whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was
the thing which the statute intended."' 16 If the transaction resulted only in
a rearrangement of the business operations involved and was not principally
motivated by tax considerations, there had been a reorganization as defined
by the Code no matter whether the non-tax motives were those of the
shareholders or of the corporations. In Lewis the court of appeals stated:
We, think that the [TIax [C]ourt has been correctly advised in
unequivocally repudiating that distinction (between corporate purpose and shareholders purpose) here . .

.

.To seek to differentiate

between (corporate purpose) and (shareholder purpose) is unrealistic and impractical, particularly with respect to closely held corporations . .

.

. The separate legal identity of these corporations

should not obscure the fact that they are operated by their shareholders in a manner thought best calculated to serve the latter's
interest. What is deemed best for the shareholder is deemed best
for the corporation, and vice versa. We think it not insignificant
that, in affirming the Bazley[ 171 and Adams" l8' decisions, the Supreme
Court gave no countenance to the distinction petitioners advocate. 19
In spite of the position taken by the Commissioner in Survaunt and
Lewis and the opinions rendered in these cases it now appears that the
Internal Revenue Service has again changed direction. Regulation section
1.355-2(c) now provides:
Business purpose. The distribution by a corporation of stock or
securities of a controlled corporation to its shareholders with
respect to its own stock or to its security holders in exchange for
16. 162 F.2d at 757, quoting the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d
809 (1934).
17. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
18. Adams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947). This case was companion litigation to Bazley and was governed by the same decision.
19. 162 F.2d at 757.
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its own securities will not qualify under Section 355 where carried
20
on for purposes not germane to the business of the corporation.
It appears clear that this section of the Regulation requires that the purpose
must be a corporate, and not a stockholder business purpose.
This requirement was strongly criticized and rejected by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Estate of Moses Parshelsky.21 While the
Parshelsky case was decided in 1962, it dealt with the 1939 Code provisions
rather than the 1954 provisions that provide for tax free split offs, split ups
and spin offs. In Parshelsky, the estate of Moses Parshelsky was denied tax
free treatment by the Tax Court on the receipt of stock distributed to Mr.
Parshelsky after a spin off of some of the assets of his wholly owned
corporation, because of the absence of a corporate business purpose. The
court of appeals reversed the Tax Court and remanded the case for further
findings of fact with the following statement:
The court must determine whether in light of all the facts, this
transaction falls within Congress' purpose in enacting Section
112(b)(11) (predecessor to Section 355) i.e., to grant tax free
treatment to those spin offs the principal purpose of which was to
effectuate valid corporate or shareholder non-tax-avoidance purposes but not to those the principal purpose of which was taxavoidance purposes. Since the tax court held that shareholder nontax-avoidance purposes could not be considered in determining
whether a spin off was within Section 112(b)(11), it failed to
evaluate all the relevant facts. We believe that such examination
of the shareholder's reasons 22 and the evaluation of their validity is
the duty of the fact finder.
The latest word on this problem is found in the dicta of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Henry H. Bonsall, Jr.2 3 In Bonsall, the
court found that the taxpayer had not satisfied the "two active business"
requirements of the Code. While realizing that this disposed of the case,
the court went on to make the observation that there was no valid shareholder business purpose for the distribution of the shares of the controlled
corporation.2 4 In support of this statement the court cited Parshelsky.
In spite of the fact that the business purpose rule has been with us since
1934, certain aspects of the rule are as uncertain today as they were at the
time the rule was first adopted. The Regulations under the 1954 Code and
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955).
21. 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing and remanding, 34 T.C. 396 (1960).
22. Id. at 21. On remand the Tax Court made an ultimate finding of fact that
Parshelsky wanted the real estate left so that it would be readily available to his executors
as a separate asset of the estate and entered decision for the petitioner.

23. 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
24. Id. at 65.
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the arguments advanced by the Commissioner in both the Parshelsky and
Bonsall cases show that, in cases where it is to its benefit to do so, the Internal
Revenue Service still intends to rely solely on corporate business purposes
in evaluating tax free distributions which follow a spin off, split off, split up
or other reorganization. The Tax Court opinion in Estate of Moses Parshelsky
in which it apparently rejected its prior position in Survaunt and Lewis
makes it very difficult to predict with any accuracy what that court will do
the next time it is faced with the problem. The only safe statement which
can be made in this area is that a taxpayer involved in a section 355 transaction should anticipate and be prepared to support claimed tax free treatment by substantial corporate business reasons for the transactions. In the
absence of valid corporate business purposes the taxpayer must be prepared
for litigation if he wants his claim of tax free treatment to be sustained.
STOCK SWAPS

The opinion in the case of Albert W. Badanes25 lays the groundwork
for a third area of conflict between the Regulations under section 355 and
the Tax Court. Section 355 (a) (2) specifically permits the division and
distribution of corporate assets to divergent groups of stockholders. This
represents a major change in the prior law applicable to spin offs. Under the
1939 Code, the Commissioner consistently took the position that unless the
stock in a devisive reorganization was distributed pro rata among the holders
of common stock, the court-made reorganization requirement of "continuity
of interest" was not satisfied. Under the 1954 Code there may be a tax free
distribution of all of the shares of stock in a newly formed subsidiary or an
already existing subsidiary to one group of stockholders, to the exclusion of
another group of stockholders, in exchange for their stock in the parent
corporation, with the retention of a second business activity by the other
group of stockholders through their stock in the original parent corporation.
One thing the new provision was not designed to permit, however, was what
in substance constitutes the sale or exchange of stock between taxpayers;
a so-called stock swap. For this reason the Commissioner provided in Regulations section 1.355-3(a)
that section 355 does not apply, however, if the substance of the
transaction is merely an exchange between shareholders or security
holders of stock or securities in one corporation for stock or securities in another corporation. For example, if two individuals, C and
D, each owned directly fifty percent of the stock of corporation M
and fifty percent of the stock of corporation N, section 355 would
not apply to a transaction in which C and D transfer all of their
25.

39 T.C. 410 (1963).
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stock in corporation M and corporation N to a new corporation P,
for all of the stock in corporation P, followed by a distribution by
P of the26stock of corporation M to C and the stock of corporation
N to D.

Badanes is the only case to date which involves the stock swap question.
In Badanes the petitioner and his associate, Tuttle, each owned fifty percent
of the stock of a beverage distributing company having operations in two
different cities and fifty percent of the stock of a realty company. A disagreement arose between Badanes and Tuttle, and pursuant to a plan, Badanes
and Tuttle transferred all of the stock of the realty company to the bottling
company. The bottling company then formed a new corporation and transferred the stock of the realty company and the assets of the bottling business
operating in one of the two cities, including a substantial amount of cash,
to the new corporation for all of its stock. The stock of the new company
was, then distributed to Badanes for all of his stock in the old bottling
company. Thus, Badanes ended up with stock in a corporation which owned
the assets of one bottling business and the stock of the realty company, and
Tuttle ended up with the stock in a corporation which owned the assets of
the other bottling company. The joint tax return of Badanes and his wife
was challenged by the Commissioner when they reported the exchange of
the stock in the old corporation for the stock of the new corporation as a
tax free split up. The Commissioner determined that the transfer did not
qualify under section 355 because "[iln substance, petitioners exchanged
their stock in the bottling company for stock in the realty corporation [and
that] such a 'stock swap' transaction is prohibited by respondent's regulations under section 355. ' '27 The Commissioner argued in the alternative
that:
even if the transactions involved do qualify for nonrecognition of
gain under section 355 to the extent of the Portsmith business (bottling business transferred to the new corporation), petitioner may
nevertheless be charged with constructive receipt of a large part of
the cash and also with constructive receipt of the Realty Company
stock, both of which items actually were assets of the Barq-Portsmith
Company (the new corporation)
whose stock was the only item
28
received by petitioner.

The Tax Court held for the petitioner on both issues.
On the first issue the court refused to look through the transaction but
instead held that the facts did not support the Commissioner because the
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(a) (1955).
27. 39 T.C. at 416.
28. Id.
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parties had stipulated that Barq-Cincinnati (the old corporation) distributed
to petitioner, in exchange for all of his shares of that company's stock, all
the issued and outstanding shares of the stock of Barq-Portsmith (the new
corporation). The basis for the court's decision is very elusive. Regardless
of the stipulation of facts, it appears that the substance of the transaction
was at least partially a swap by Badanes of stock in the original bottling
company for Tuttle's stock in the realty company. At first glance it appears
that the court is holding that form will take precedence over substance in
a Badanes-type transaction.. However, on closer examination we must disregard this explanation because the opinion specifically states that "the substance of what was done coincides with the facts as stipulated. '29 Another
explanation could be that the court felt that this was merely a case of de
minimus in which the real estate was so insignificant that it had no effect
on the overall transaction. This is unlikely, however, because the alternative
argument advanced by the Commissioner, that the real estate constituted boot,
is the obvious solution to a de minimus situation, and this argument was also
rejected by the court with a statement that the stock in the realty company
was owned by the new corporation and there was no compelling reason to
disregard the separate entity of the corporation.
It appears from the Badanes opinion that the court was favorably persuaded on the petitioner's behalf by the non-tax motives for the rearrangement of stockholder and corporate affairs. While it is a very dangerous
maxim to follow, one might speculate that if a taxpayer can persuasively
demonstrate compelling non-tax motives, a section 355 rearrangement of
corporate affairs will be upheld, if the expressed statutory conditions of
section 355 are satisfied, regardless of a lack of technical compliance with the
additional requirements and restrictions of the Regulations.
29. Id.

